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ABSTRACT
This article observes a startling new appellate jurisdictional battle
waged by regional circuit courts to chip away the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction in patent cases. The Eleventh Circuit took an
unprecedented step by engaging in patent claim construction and
infringement under literal infringement analysis and the doctrine of
equivalents analysis. In a case of first impression, the Eleventh
Circuit asserted that it legitimately has appellate jurisdiction to
decide cases involving substantive patent law. Instead of grabbing
jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit, through its Chief Judge, grabbed
public attention by advocating for the abolishment of the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases. The Chief Judge
announced that the Seventh Circuit is able and ready to hear patent
cases. Why do regional circuit courts now want to assert jurisdiction
over patent cases? What implications can be drawn from the
jurisdictional battle? Are their assertions of jurisdiction over patent
cases legitimate? This article addresses these urgent questions.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit has enjoyed its rise in prominence, as patent
cases have attracted media attention across the nation and the world.1
A little more than three decades since its creation by a congressional
act2 to inject uniformity into the patent law system3 and to discourage
forum shopping,4 the Federal Circuit saw its patent docket rise from
121 cases in 1983 to 448 cases in 2013.5 Companies aggressively
procure patents for every imaginable invention.6 Patent applications
leaped fivefold from 117,987 in 1982 to 609,052 in 2013.7 The latest
overhaul of patent law, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act8 for
1. See generally Apple and Samsung Agree to Drop Patent Lawsuits Outside US, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/aug/06/apple-samsung-drop-patentlawsuits-outside-usa; Andrew Chung, RPX Buys Apple-Backed Rockstar Patents for $900 Million,
REUTERS,
Dec.
23,
2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-rpx-rockstar-ipidUSKBN0K11AI20141223; Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAI (May 31,
2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war;
Brent Kendall & Ashby Jones, Supreme Court Sides With Teva in Patent Case; High Court Reverses
Ruling That Invalidated Patent on Multiple-Sclerosis Drug, WALL ST. JOURNAL (Jan. 20, 2015, 7:38
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-sides-with-teva-in-patent-case-on-copaxone-14217
67907.
2. Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25, 57 (1982). See
also Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Disuniformity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2007, 2008–09 (2014)
(discussing the creation of the Federal Circuit by Congress); Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 543, 577–80 (2003) (analyzing the
purposes of the Act to create the Federal Circuit).
3. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981) (The Federal Circuit “will provide nationwide uniformity in
patent law” and “make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable”; such uniformity will
“eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in
the field.”).
4. See Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1190 (1996) (explaining legislative history of the creation of the Federal Circuit);
David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 675 (2013) (stating that Congress created
the Federal Circuit to curb forum shopping).
5. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Filings of Patent Infringement Appeals from the
U.S. District Courts, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Caseload%20Patent%
20Infringement%20%282006-2015%29.pdf; The First Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 100 F.R.D. 499, 501 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449,
453–54 (2010) (discussing patent proliferation).
7. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 – 2014,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
8. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). On
September 16, 2011, the President signed into law the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act. Id.; see also
President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate Economic
Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs, OFFICE OF THE PRESS
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innovation and job creation purposes, ironically obtained the
nickname of “Patent Lawyers’ Full Employment Act.”9 That means
as the numbers of patent applications and patent grants increase, so
follow the filings for patent litigation in district courts across the
nation and subsequent appeals to the Federal Circuit.10 All
indications demonstrate a sure bet that the Federal Circuit will
continue to be “the Almighty”11 and “the envy of the system.”12
Perhaps, the Federal Circuit desires more than enthroning on the
apex of the system, though. The Federal Circuit has previously
overreached in areas that it should not and must not.13 For example,
the Federal Circuit’s overreach into areas of state law, from sales of
intellectual property assets to secured transactions with patents as
collateral, has drawn much scrutiny and criticism from scholars and
judges.14 The Federal Circuit’s expansion has prompted a new patent
jurisdictional battle emboldened by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Gunn v. Minton15—finding no Federal Circuit jurisdiction over state
SECRETARY, Sept. 16, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obamasigns-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
9. Skip Kaltenheuser, From the USA: Not So Intellectual Property, INT’L BAR ASS’N,
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=557b2afa-ab58-4bdf-93b0-b956274d2f95
(last
visited Jan. 7, 2016) (criticizing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was not for jobs creation in
general, but for the lawyers).
10. Ron Katznelson, The America Invents Act at Work – The Major Cause for the Recent Rise in
Patent Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/15/aia-themajor-cause-for-rise-in-patent-litigation/id=39118/ (investigating and observing that the AIA “appears
to be the dominant cause of the recent major uptick in patent lawsuits”).
11. Maggie Tamburro, The ‘Almighty’ Federal Circuit Evolving? Patent Policy & Jurisprudence,
BULLSEYE (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.ims-expertservices.com/bullseye/january-2013/the-almightyfederal-circuit-evolving-patent-policy-jurisprudence/.
12. Edward Reines, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, PATENTDOCS
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/10/in-defense-of-the-federal-circuit-a-response-tojudge-wood.html (“In many ways, the Federal Circuit’s patent docket has become the envy of the
system.”).
13. See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen, In the Name of Patent Stewardship: The Federal Circuit’s
Overreach Into Commercial Law, 67 FLA. L. REV. 127 (2015).
14. See id.; Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (critiquing the Federal
Circuit’s overreach in states’ important areas); Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 652–53 (Tex. 2011)
(Guzman, J., dissenting) (observing the Federal Circuit’s unjustifiable broad reach into area of state
law); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 29–30 (2014) (explaining the
roots of the Federal Circuit’s expansive view on its jurisdiction over state claims involving patents).
15. See generally Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (limiting the scope of “arising under”
jurisdiction for patent cases by holding the state claim of legal malpractice in patent cases do not arise
under patent law and state courts have jurisdiction). The Gunn decision overturns the Federal Circuit’s
precedents in patent legal malpractice in Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
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claims of legal malpractice in patent cases—and being waged by the
Eleventh and Seventh Circuits.16
The Eleventh Circuit could not sit idly by watching the Federal
Circuit hear all cases related to patents.17 The Eleventh Circuit
decided to strike back.18 In a case of first impression, the Eleventh
Circuit embarked on a patent claim construction and infringement
analysis under literal infringement and the doctrine of equivalents.19
Conducting de novo review of the district court’s claim construction,
the Eleventh Circuit allowed general dictionaries, such as MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary, to
be the primary sources for constructing ordinary meanings of claim
terms.20 The Eleventh Circuit’s standard for claim construction is in
direct conflict with the Federal Circuit’s standard, paving the way for
forum shopping.21
While the Eleventh Circuit is quietly grabbing jurisdiction to
justify its new experiment in patent claim construction and
infringement analysis, the Seventh Circuit—through Chief Judge
Diane P. Wood—has employed a different approach.22 Chief Judge
Wood of the Seventh Circuit grabbed the public’s attention by
vocalizing policy reasons in support of a quest to end the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive patent jurisdiction.23 The Chief Judge announced
that the Seventh Circuit is ready and able to handle patent issues.24
Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007) and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504
F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Id.
16. See infra Parts I–III.
17. See infra Part I.
18. Id.
19. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs, Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2013).
20. Id. at 847–48; see also infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive
Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 6–10 (2013).
24. Id. at 6–7. The Chief Judge remarked about the Seventh Circuit’s capability and expertise in
complex cases:
So why we should treat patent law differently is a puzzle.
If the answer is simply that patent appeals are much more difficult
than any other type of case that comes before the courts, there are two
responses. . . . [T]he regional courts of appeals routinely deal with all manner of
difficult, technically complex subjects. If there are doubters among you, I would
direct you to the Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in Bernstein v. Bankert, in
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What could be some possible explanations for the Eleventh Circuit
seizing jurisdiction in patent cases and the Seventh Circuit
demanding for a share of patent cases? Why do they desire and seek
to hear patent cases? Do they have judicial wisdom to offer, or are
they envious of the Federal Circuit’s rising prominence? Are there
some merits to the circuits’ actions that other regional circuits may
soon adopt? This Article explores possible answers to these
questions.
Part I of this Article explains the genesis of the Eleventh Circuit’s
jurisdiction grabbing in a case where patent claim construction and
infringement analysis are at the heart of the plaintiff’s action against
the defendant.25 This Part also carefully presents how the district
court constructed claim terms and how the Eleventh Circuit
conducted the de novo review of the claim construction and
infringement analysis.26 Part II offers a critique of the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision.27 There are three sections in this Part of the
Article. The first section dissects how the decision displays both an
incompetence in, and ignorance of, patent law, particularly complex
rules of claim construction governing intrinsic and extrinsic evidence
and policy reasons for procedures and sources of interpretation. 28 The
second section focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit’s experiment
with patent claim construction is in direct conflict with sister circuits’
precedents, notably the Seventh and Fifth Circuits in cases with
similar facts.29 Prior cases establish that both the Seventh and Fifth
Circuits routinely declined jurisdiction in similar patent cases under
the “well-pleaded complaint” doctrine.30 The last section explains
how the Eleventh Circuit’s seizure of jurisdiction shows a disregard
which we clarify (in over seventy-six pages) what events trigger the availability
of a § 113 contribution claim under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (or CERCLA), and when the party must instead
resort to a § 107 claim for cost recovery.
Id.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Part I.
Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
Id.
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for the Supreme Court’s “age-old rule”31 that a court extending its
jurisdiction “where none exists has always worked injustice in
particular cases.”32
Part III follows by focusing on the Seventh Circuit’s recent
action.33 Part III identifies the Seventh Circuit’s response vis-à-vis
Chief Judge Wood’s keynote remarks to end the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive patent jurisdiction in light of its own precedents in similar
cases.34 Part IV explains the circuits’ responses in two sections.35 The
first section frames the possible explanation of their responses as
“judicial wisdom or patent envy” in the context of what patents have
become in today’s economy.36 Patents are undeniably important,
prevalent, and omnipresent today.37 The second section focuses on
the rise of the “Almighty” Federal Circuit and examines whether
judicial wisdom or patent envy may be a plausible answer.38
Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit has already injected uncertainty in
patent law for claim construction, and the Seventh Circuit has
demanded a share of patent appeal cases.39 If other regional circuits
follow suit—either by demanding or seizing jurisdiction to engage in
claim construction—the end of patent law uniformity and the
beginning of forum shopping will soon arrive.40
Facing the reality explained in Part IV, this Article suggests to
regional circuit courts that there are more legitimate grounds for
asserting appellate jurisdiction in cases involving patents.41 For
example, as explained in Part V of this Article, in cases where the
patent issues are non-substantial and where state interests are
stronger than federal interests in resolving state claims, federalism
principles dictate that state courts have jurisdiction over those
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Id.; see also infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
Id.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part V.
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cases.42 That means if the cases are in federal courts due to diversity
and supplemental jurisdiction, regional circuits will have jurisdiction
on appeals and can decide the patent issues related to the state law
claims.43 Additionally, in cases where the patent claims are noncompulsory counterclaims, regional circuit courts can also have
jurisdiction.44
Having legitimate grounds to hear cases involving patent issues
comes with a responsibility that regional circuits must address.45 The
body of substantive patent law has grown in the last three decades
without regional circuit involvement.46 They cannot simply disregard
this growth under the banner of judicial wisdom. Patent litigation has
already become expensive.47 Uncertainty and forum shopping will
fuel the cost of patent litigation, and all involved will suffer.48 That
does not mean regional circuit courts should shy away from cases
where patents are involved. As this Article concludes, sharing
judicial labor is a task of delicate balance that all circuit courts must
treasure in the interest of justice.49
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT: GRABBING JURISDICTION
After years of presiding over a vast number of cases and enjoying
a larger docket of cases than its regional sister circuits, the Eleventh
Circuit has decided to extend its appellate jurisdiction.50 It ventured
42. See infra Part V.B.
43. See infra Part V.C.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25, 57 (1982).
47. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981).
48. See supra notes 3–4.
49. See infra Conclusion.
50. See
2014
U.S.
Courts
of
Appeals
Case
Law,
JUSTIA
U.S.
LAW,
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Eleventh
Circuit enjoys a large caseload compared to most other regional circuits. Id. For example, in 2014 alone,
the Eleventh Circuit had a docket of 2,019 appellate cases. 2014 Eleventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/2014/ (last visited
Jan. 7, 2016). The Third Circuit, on the other hand, had 1,368 cases in the same period. 2014 Third
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellatecourts/ca3/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Sixth Circuit had 1,509 cases during 2014. 2014 Sixth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-
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into the area of substantive patent law by exerting its authority to
grab jurisdiction and engaging in claim construction and
infringement analysis under both literal infringement and the doctrine
of equivalents in a case of first impression.51
The Eleventh Circuit held per curiam in MDS (Canada) Inc. v.
Rad Source Technologies, Inc. that it had appellate jurisdiction to
hear an appeal of a breach of contract claim that would require the
resolution of a claim of patent infringement in order for the
complainant to succeed.52 The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to
construct the patent claim scope and perform patent infringement
analysis, an unprecedented action unauthorized by either Congress or
the Supreme Court under the well-pleaded complaint rule.53
In that case, Rad Source licensed its three patents, U.S. Patent Nos.
6,212,255 (the ‘255 patent), 6,489,099 (the ‘099 patent), and
6,614,876 (the ‘876 patent), to MDS for the manufacturing and
marketing of RS 3000 blood irradiation devices.54 Rad Source later
produced a new device, RS 3400, as a direct medical upgrade of RS
3000.55 MDS brought a lawsuit against Rad Source for breach of the
license agreement by selling RS 3400, which was allegedly
infringing on the licensed patents.56 To prevail, plaintiff MDS had to
establish that the RS 3400 devices were within the scope of the
licensed patents. The district court ruled in favor of Rad Source, and
MDS appealed.57 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to decide

courts/ca6/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Seventh Circuit had a much smaller docket of 1,250 for
the same time. 2014 Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW,
http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The Eighth
Circuit had 1,254 cases during 2014. 2014 Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S.
LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca8/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The
Tenth Circuit had 1,235 cases for 2014 and the Federal Circuit 1,266. 2014 Tenth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S. LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/2014/
(last visited Jan. 7, 2016); see also 2014 Federal Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Case Law, JUSTIA U.S.
LAW, http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/cafc/2014/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
51. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 837–38, 846 (11th Cir. 2013).
52. Id. at 837–38.
53. See infra Part II.
54. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 838.
55. Id. at 840.
56. Id. at 840–41.
57. Id.
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whether RS 3400 devices “[e]mbody Claim 6 of the ‘255 [p]atent” in
order to determine the claim for breach of the license agreement.58
To reach its decision, the Eleventh Circuit conducted a review of
the patent claim construction and infringement analysis.59 For claim
construction, the Eleventh Circuit conducted de novo review of the
district court’s construction.60 For infringement, The Eleventh Circuit
employed “clear error” review of the district court’s finding “as to
whether the claims, as properly construed, read on the accused
device.”61
The Eleventh Circuit began its claim construction analysis by
asserting that the “words of a claim are generally given their ordinary
and customary meaning.”62 The Eleventh Circuit continued by
quoting the Federal Circuit’s dicta on claim construction: “In some
cases, the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a
person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges,
and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the
application of widely accepted meaning of commonly understood
words.”63 With such a frame of reference on claim construction and
nothing more, the Eleventh Circuit proceeded in its review of the
district court’s construction of five claim terms: “(1) beam, (2) source
of X-ray radiation, (3) thickness dimension, (4) rotating, and (5)
vertical area” of Claim 6 of the ‘255 patent.64
As to the first two claim terms, “beam” and “source of X-ray
radiation,” the Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court’s
interpretation of “beam” included a “cone of irradiation, but not a
field of irradiation,” and the district court’s interpretation of “source
of X-ray radiation” meant a “directional source, instead of a
nondirectional source.”65 The district court relied on experts’
testimony for its construction of “source of X-ray radiation” and the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 846.
Id.
MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 846.
Id.
Id. at 846 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Id. at 846 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314).
Id. at 847.
Id.
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Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of “beam” for its construction
of the claim term.66 The Eleventh Circuit also mentioned that the
description of the invention and one of the figures in the
specifications make references to a “beam” that would suggest a
“directional, cone-like shape.”67 The Eleventh Circuit summarily
concluded that the construction for the first two terms was correct.68
As to the term “rotating,” the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that to
“rotate a bag to an opposite side, the rotation necessary would be 180
degrees, as opposed to a continuous 360–degree rotation.”69 The
Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s construction of
“rotating.”70
With respect to the term “vertical area,” the Eleventh Circuit stated
that the district court’s construction means “that the bag must be
oriented vertically, as opposed to horizontally” and that the district
court relied on Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary for the
definition of “vertical” as “perpendicular to the plane of the horizon
or to a primary axis.”71 Without further discussion, the Eleventh

66. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 847. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted what the district court
did at trial:
Using the analogy relied on by the experts at trial, the district court determined
that the beam of X-ray mentioned in Claim 6 is more like the cone-shaped beam
of light from a flashlight than the field of light emitted by a fluorescent tube light.
Nordion’s expert, Stephen Szeglin, testified that the terms in Claim 6 could
encompass both a cone and a field of irradiation because X-ray beams are
produced omni-directionally. Dr. Roberto Uribe, the expert who appeared on
behalf of Rad Source, testified that a ‘beam’ of X-ray would refer to radiation
traveling in a well-defined direction. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a
‘beam’ as both a ‘[a] ray, or “bundle” of parallel rays, of light emitted from the
sun or other luminous body; out-streaming radiance’ and as ‘[a] directed flow of
radiation or particles.’
Id. (quoting Beam, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2015), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
16505).
67. Id. at 847 (“For example, the description of the invention explains that ‘the output port of each of
the X-ray tubes . . . should preferably have a diameter to provide a 45 degree beam such that the beam
has at least a diameter of 15.5 cm at 23 cm distant from the tube.’ And Figure 4, which is a sketch of an
embodiment of the single-source system, indicates a cone-like beam of X-rays.”).
68. Id. at 847–48.
69. Id. at 847.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 848.
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Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction with reliance
primarily on the general dictionary.72
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did
not err in its claim construction.73 In the next step of infringement
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit simply concluded that there is no literal
infringement for the following reason:
The RS 3400 uses a continuously rotating cylindrical
container to hold the blood bag, so the process of
irradiation does not occur in two steps, with a 180–degree
rotation in between. And the blood bag in the RS 3400 is
oriented horizontally from the X-ray source. Thus the RS
3400 cannot fall within the literal terms of the claim.74
Furthermore, for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
the Eleventh Circuit readily affirmed the district court’s finding of no
infringement:
The irradiator described in Claim 6 holds the blood bag at a
fixed distance from the X-ray source, and the blood bag is
irradiated from one side, then turned and irradiated from
the opposite side. By contrast, the blood bag in the RS 3400
is continuously rotated around the X-ray source in an
elliptical pattern, like the orbit of a planet around the Sun.75
With its decision on claim construction, literal infringement and
doctrine of equivalents infringement, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
RS 3400 does not embody in whole or in part the ‘255 patent, and,
72. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 848. However, with respect to the last claim term, “thickness
dimension,” the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court’s construction of the term as four
centimeters or less. Id. The Eleventh Circuit stated that because Claim 4 defines the thickness of a bag to
be four centimeters and Claim 6 does not, the term “thickness” in Claim 6 is interpreted as the
“narrower side of the rectangular bag” even though the description of the invention states that the
thickness of the bags is at four centimeters. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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therefore, Rad Source did not breach the patent license agreement
with MDS.76 Overall, the Eleventh Circuit did not examine most of
the claim terms in context of the claim language itself, the
specification of the patent, or the prosecution history.77
II. CRITIQUE OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S PATENT DECISION
A. Incompetence in and Ignorance of Patent Law
MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. illustrates
the problem of a regional circuit court’s overreach into the Federal
Circuit’s substantive patent law and exclusive patent jurisdiction.
Because the Federal Circuit has already developed a copious body of
substantial patent law since its inception on October 1, 1982,78
regional circuit courts, including the Eleventh Circuit, have little or
no expertise in the substantive patent law area.79 By its own
admission, the Eleventh Circuit was treading into uncharted territory
of patent claim construction and infringement analysis.80 The
overreach occurred through its aggressive exertion of patent
jurisdiction.81
Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the reality that in the
last thirty years patent claim construction has become highly
structured and complex,82 and a new set of rules for claim
76. Id.
77. See id. at 847–48.
78. Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 402, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
79. See generally Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982)
(addressing “on sale” bar and patent invalidity). The last time that the Eleventh Circuit had an
opportunity to address patent infringement was July 9, 1982, three months before the Federal Circuit
was created. Id.
80. MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 837–38 (“This appeal presents a jurisdictional issue of first
impression in our Court: whether the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a
breach of contract claim that would require the resolution of a claim of patent infringement for the
complainant to succeed.”).
81. Id. at 841 (“[W]e conclude that the district court had diversity jurisdiction and supplemental
jurisdiction, but not patent jurisdiction[.] [W]e have jurisdiction over this appeal.”) (internal citations
omitted).
82. See generally Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim
Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 714–15
(2010) (observing that “the substantive standards and process for delineating patent claim terms have
undergone significant evolution” and the “bewildering arrays of cases and rules” can “overwhelm
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construction has been established.83 For example, with respect to
construction of ordinary claim terms, the Federal Circuit
categorically rejected heavy reliance on dictionary meanings.84 The
Federal Circuit requires that proper construction of ordinary claim
terms must first focus on intrinsic evidence: the claim language, the

litigants, counsel, law clerks, and jurists”). The authors attribute the complexity of claim constructions
to “the inherent difficulties of using language to define the boundaries of abstract and intangible rights.
These challenges grew with the rise of information technologies. The boundaries of patent claims to
software and business methods have proven particularly ambiguous.” Id. at 716.
83. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372, 378 (1996). The seminal decision in
patent claim construction is Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., which directed district courts to
conduct patent claim construction hearings to interpret patent claims as a matter “exclusively within the
province of the court” as the first step in determining patent infringement. Id. at 372. A Markman
hearing can be a lengthy, full-blown trial. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979–80
(Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The Markman decision sets forth important rules, including
that “[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part,” and the “written
description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the purpose and
function of claims.” Id. at 979–80. In addition to the procedure provided under Markman, the Federal
Circuit in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. imposed a more rigorous framework for claim
construction:
First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and
nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention. . . . [S]econd, it is
always necessary to review the specification to determine whether the inventor
has used any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary
meaning. . . . Third, the court may also consider the prosecution history of the
patent, if in evidence. . . . In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence
alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances,
it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also Menell, supra
note 82, at 721–24 (discussing intrinsic evidence in construction of claim terms). Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has frequently overturned district courts’ claim constructions. See, e.g., Christian A. Chu,
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1075,
1090 (2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit’s overturn rate for district court claim constructions was
almost 40% of cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2001) (reporting overturn rate 33% of district courts cases). The
reversal rate, however, has decreased significantly due to the Federal Circuit’s monumental decision in
Phillips. See generally J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014)
(reporting the decrease in Federal Circuit’s reversal rate on claim constructions in recent years).
84. See, e.g., Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp., 235 Fed. App’x 741, 745 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing
the district court for relying too much on extrinsic evidence). In fact, district courts following proper
claim constructions enjoy a lower reversal rate. See, e.g., Tony Zeuli & Rachel Clark Hughey, Avoiding
Patent Claim Construction Errors After Phillips, FED. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 50, 51 (“Of 64
published Federal Circuit claim construction decisions applying the Phillips decision since mid-2007,
the Federal Circuit has affirmed the district court’s claim construction in its entirety in 39 decisions.
That means that, in the sample considered for this review, the court affirmed more than 60 percent of the
claim construction cases—a vast improvement over the 50 percent or higher rate of decisions that were
reversed prior to [2005].”).
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specification, and the patent prosecution history.85 Extrinsic
evidence, such as dictionary meanings and expert testimony, should
not be the primary source for claim construction.86
Specifically, in the en banc decision Phillips v. AWH Corp., the
Federal Circuit comprehensively reviewed decisional law history and
policy for claim construction87 dated as far back as 1876 with the
Supreme Court’s mandate that the claims themselves are of “primary
importance” in ascertaining precisely the meaning of claim terms for
knowing what is patented.88 The requirement of reliance on the
claims themselves for claim construction rests on the strong policy
that it is “unjust to the public” and “an evasion of the law” to
construe claim terms “in a manner different from the plain import of
its terms.”89 In addition to reliance on claim language for ordinary
meaning of claim terms,90 the Phillips court discussed the use of
other intrinsic evidence, such as the specifications and the
prosecution history in claim construction.91 For instance, in
construing the ordinary meaning of a claim term, as the Phillips court
restated, claim construction cannot be done in “a vacuum” but must
look “at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written
description and the prosecution history.”92 The rationale for looking
85. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence, emphasizing the importance of intrinsic evidence and cautioning against the use of
extrinsic evidence).
86. See, e.g., Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1348–56 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(Federal Circuit’s de novo review of constructing the claim term “aesthetically pleasing” by (1) first
looking at the term in context of the claim, (2) if the claim language “lacks sufficient clarity to ascertain
the scope of the claims,” analyzing the term in the specification, and (3) analyzing the prosecution
history to determine whether it provides any reasonable construction of the term). The Datamize court
consulted the extrinsic evidence in the record of expert testimonies and disregarded them. Id. at 1353–
54.
87. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312–19.
88. Id. at 1312 (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876)). See also Cont’l Paper Bag
Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908) (“[T]he claims measure the invention.”); Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) (“[T]he claims made in the patent
are the sole measure of the grant.”).
89. White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886).
90. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (“[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the
meaning of particular claim terms.”); ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“[T]he context of the surrounding words of the claim also must be considered in determining the
ordinary and customary meaning of those terms.”).
91. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313–14.
92. Id. at 1313 (quoting Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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at the ordinary meaning of a claim term in the context of the patent,
including specification or written description and the prosecution
history, is that the intrinsic record provides the court with the
“technological and temporal context” to ascertain the meaning of the
claim term in accordance with the inventor or “one of ordinary skill
in the art at the time of the invention.”93
Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the canon of claim
construction for ordinary meaning of claim terms.94 The Eleventh
Circuit permitted the district court to rely primarily on extrinsic
evidence: experts’ testimonies and two general dictionaries, Oxford
and Merriam-Webster, to serve as the principal source for claim
construction.95 Worse, the Eleventh Circuit cited the Phillips decision
for support.96 If the Eleventh Circuit had read Phillips a few
paragraphs further and with greater care, it would have discovered
that Phillips rejected the reliance on experts’ testimony and general
dictionaries as the primary source for ascertaining ordinary meaning
of claim terms.97 The Phillips court stated that extrinsic evidence is
“less reliable,” “quite misleading,” and “suffer[s] from bias” because
the evidence is not part of the patent and its prosecution history; it is
created at the time of litigation for purpose of litigation; it is offered
by a hypothetical person with skills in the art; and it may not reflect
the understanding of a skilled person in the field of the patent.98
Moreover, the Phillips court condemned primary reliance on
extrinsic evidence for construing the ordinary meaning of claim
terms because such reliance derogates the undisputable public record
of the patent and undermines “the public notice function of
patents.”99 In summary, the Phillips court warned that even though

93. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (quoting V–Formation, Inc. v. Benetton Grp. SpA, 401 F.3d 1307,
1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). See also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (proper definition is the “definition that
one of ordinary skill in the art could ascertain from the intrinsic evidence in the record”).
94. See supra Part I.
95. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs, Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 847–48 (11th Cir. 2013).
96. Id. at 846.
97. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318–19.
98. Id. at 1318.
99. See id. at 1319.
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extrinsic evidence may be useful, it is “unlikely to result in a reliable
interpretation of patent claim scope . . . .”100
Moreover, the Phillips court ruled strongly against reliance on
general dictionaries in claim construction because general
dictionaries “strive to collect all uses of particular words, from the
common to the obscure,” and offer “multiple dictionary definitions
for a term” that will “extend beyond the ‘construction of the patent
[that] is confirmed by the avowed understanding of the patentee,
expressed by him, or on his behalf, when his application for the
original patent was pending.’”101 Federal Circuit cases permit courts
to rely on technical dictionaries to construe claim terms, but only if
the technical dictionary definition “does not contradict any definition
found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.”102
Illustratively, applying the precedent set forth in Phillips, the
Federal Circuit in Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp. rejected the district
court’s claim construction of the term “surface” because it gave too
much weight to the dictionary definition rather than to intrinsic
evidence.103 In that case, the district court consulted Webster’s II New
College Dictionary and defined “surface” as “the exterior face of an
object” or “a material layer constituting such an exterior face.”104 The
district court also “relied on the Random House College
Dictionary . . . to further define ‘surface’ to mean ‘the outer face,
outside, or exterior boundary of a thing’ or ‘part or all of the
boundary of a solid.’”105 On appeal, the Federal Circuit demonstrated
how the term “surface” should have been properly construed under
Phillips.106 The Federal Circuit explained that the “proper claim
construction based on the teachings in Phillips begins with the claim

100. Id.
101. Id. at 1321–22 (quoting Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227 (1880)).
102. Id. at 1322–23; see also Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 770 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(noting the term “module” has technical dictionary meanings in accordance with IBM Dictionary of
Computing, Alan Freedman’s The Computer Glossary, and John Daintith & Edmund Wring, Dictionary
of Computing).
103. Byrne v. Black & Decker Corp., 235 F. App’x 741, 745 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
104. Id. at 744.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 745.
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language.”107 The Federal Circuit carefully examined how the term
“surface” appears in the context of the claim language itself.108 Next,
the Federal Circuit looked to the specification of the patent and
identified where in the specification the meaning of the term
“surface” is supported.109 Last, the Federal Circuit focused on
prosecution history and found how certain cited references must be
overcome during prosecution that lent support to the construction of
the term “surface” to be “flat,” “continuous,” “not de minimis,”
“two-dimensional,” and one “that is not narrow but has a width less
than the feed increment of [a] trimmer head and is itself generally
planar.”110
Because the district court did not engage in proper claim
construction and relied too much on general dictionaries, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court erred in its claim construction of
the ordinary claim term “surface” under Phillips.111 Phillips’
framework of claim construction is profound. Indeed, the structured
claim construction teachings propounded by Phillips in 2005 have
brought a new era of certainty.112 Since Phillips, the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate of district courts’ claim constructions has dropped from
44% in 2004 to 16.5% in 2009.113
The Eleventh Circuit charted its own path for claim construction
despite established patent law, the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion
in Phillips, and claim constructions post-Phillips to guide it. The
Eleventh Circuit authorized claim construction with primary reliance
on expert testimony and general dictionaries to ascertain the ordinary
meaning of claim terms.114 The Eleventh Circuit’s conduct can only
be viewed as either a complete ignorance of patent law or a deliberate
contradiction of the Federal Circuit’s precedent established in
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Byrne, 235 F. App’x at 745.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 745–46.
112. Anderson & Menell, supra note 83, at 5–6 (discussing the new data on the Federal Circuit’s
reversal rate on claim constructions since Phillips).
113. Id.
114. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad
Source Techs, Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 847–48 (11th Cir. 2013).
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Phillips and its progeny on claim construction for ordinary claim
terms. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit’s experiment in a case of
first impression has injected uncertainty in claim construction cases.
Litigants can now engage in forum shopping to select an appellate
forum with claim construction rules that may influence infringement
analysis results.115 Litigants now know that in the Eleventh Circuit
they can heavily rely on general dictionaries, expert testimony, and
other extrinsic evidence while Phillips forbids them from so doing in
the Federal Circuit.
B. Openly Contradicting Other Sister Circuits’ Precedents
The Eleventh Circuit’s experiment with patent claim construction
in MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. also conflicts
with sister circuits’ precedents on exclusive patent appeal
jurisdiction. Notably, the decision openly contradicts the Seventh and
Fifth Circuit’s precedents.116
For instance, in U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, the Seventh Circuit
declined patent jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Federal
Circuit.117 Factually, U.S. Valves is similar to MDS. In U.S. Valves,
plaintiff U.S. Valves claimed that defendant Dray sold valves in
violation of the parties’ patent license agreement.118 Dray invented an
internal piston valve, obtained a patent for the invention, and licensed
the patent to U.S. Valves in exchange for royalty payments.119 Over
time, however, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, and
Dray terminated the patent license agreement.120 Subsequently, Dray
115. Claim construction “plays a critical role in nearly every patent case. It is central to the evaluation
of infringement and validity, and can affect or determine the outcome of other significant issues such as
unenforceability, enablement, and remedies.” Menell et al., supra note 82, at 714.
116. See generally U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811 (7th Cir. 1999); Scherbatskoy v.
Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 1997).
117. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 815; see also Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 964 (7th Cir. 1988)
(transferring the case involving ownership of new patents to the Federal Circuit under the well-pleadedcomplaint rules and answering in the affirmative the issue: “May a question ‘arise under’ the patent
laws, thus creating federal jurisdiction in the district court, but not ‘arise under’ the patent laws for
purposes of appellate jurisdiction?”).
118. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 812.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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began producing and selling the internal piston valve and another
type of valve called the sliding ring valve; both valves served the
same functions.121 Dray also filed a patent application for the sliding
ring valve.122 Upon learning about Dray’s conduct, U.S. Valves
asserted that the sliding ring valve was the equivalent of the internal
piston valve and, therefore, was covered by the parties’ exclusive
patent license agreement.123 Alleging a breach of contract, U.S.
Valves claimed that the licensed patents covered both types of Dray’s
valves.124 The district court found breach of contract, issued a
permanent injunction, and awarded damages against Dray.125 On
appeal in the Seventh Circuit based on diversity jurisdiction, Dray
requested that the Seventh Circuit transfer the case to the Federal
Circuit because U.S. Valves’ claim for breach of contract necessarily
would include patent law as an essential element of the claim.126
Evaluating whether Dray breached the contract would require a
determination of whether Dray’s valves infringed the plaintiff’s
licensed patents.127 In other words, the patent infringement analysis
was substantial and a necessary element of the plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim.128 The Seventh Circuit focused on whether the district
court’s jurisdiction over the complaint rested on diversity jurisdiction
or patent jurisdiction.129 The Seventh Circuit applied the wellpleaded complaint doctrine’s test mandated in the Supreme Court’s
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. decision. There, the
Court stated:
[Patent law] jurisdiction extends only to those cases in

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 812.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 814. Dray conceded the breach of contract based on his company had manufactured and
sold the internal piston valve. Id. at 812. With respect to the sliding ring valve, the parties disputed on
whether these valves were covered by the patent license agreement for the calculation of damages. Id. at
812–13.
128. Id. at 813.
129. Id.
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which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that
federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution
of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent
law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
claims.130
The Seventh Circuit noted that U.S. Valves’ claim for breach of
contract does not state a patent law claim. Thus, the first prong of
Christianson was not applicable.131 Under the second prong of the
test, the Seventh Circuit observed that because (1) the license
agreement between Dray and U.S. Valves granted U.S. Valves the
“‘exclusive right to manufacture, use, sell, advertise, and distribute’”
the licensed products covered by the licensed patents and (2) U.S.
Valves claimed that Dray was selling valves in violation of the
exclusive license provision, “the only way for U.S. Valves to
establish this claim [was] for it to show that Dray sold valves
covered” by the licensed patents.132 Consequently, to establish breach
of contract, “the court must first examine the patent and determine
which valves are covered and whether the patent was infringed.”133
In other words, “patent law [was] a necessary element of U.S.
Valves’ breach of contract action,” and the Seventh Circuit did not
have jurisdiction.134 The Federal Circuit had the exclusive
jurisdiction, and the Seventh Circuit, therefore, transferred the case to
the Federal Circuit.135
Likewise, in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., the Fifth Circuit
rendered a similar decision by declining jurisdiction and transferring
the case to the Federal Circuit.136 In that case, Serge A. Scherbatskoy,
Sr. obtained patents for processes relating to “measuring while
130. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 813. (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S.
800, 809 (1988)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 813–14.
133. Id. at 814.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997).
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drilling” or “MWD” technology.137 Scherbatskoy then entered into a
license agreement with Gearhart-Owen Industries, Inc. for Gearhart’s
use of the patents.138 Halliburton later acquired Gearhart and engaged
in a dispute with Scherbatskoy over the rights and obligations under
the license agreement for the MWD patents.139 The parties negotiated
a Settlement Agreement and a new Patent License Agreement.140
Under these agreements, Scherbatskoy granted Halliburton a license
to use the MWD patents in exchange for royalty payments. 141 In
addition, the Patent License Agreement provided that if Halliburton
acquired a “New Company” that had offered MWD services prior to
the date of Halliburton’s acquisition of the company, Halliburton
would have to pay additional royalties.142
Thereafter, Halliburton acquired certain assets from Smith
International Inc., including all of Smith’s MWD technology.143
Halliburton asserted that its acquisition of Smith’s assets did not
amount to an acquisition of a “New Company.”144 Accordingly,
Halliburton refused to pay additional royalties to Scherbatskoy.145
Scherbatskoy brought suit for breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty against Halliburton in a Texas state court.146
Halliburton successfully removed the action to a federal district court
on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, insisting that
Scherbatskoy’s complaint invoked patent law, and diversity
jurisdiction.147 At summary judgment, the district court granted
Halliburton’s motion that there was no breach of contract.148
Scherbatskoy appealed to the Fifth Circuit.149 Halliburton moved to

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 289.
Id.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scherbatskoy, 125 F.3d at 290.
Id.
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dismiss the appeal or to transfer the appeal to the Federal Circuit in
the alternative.150
The Fifth Circuit decided the jurisdiction issue.151 In determining
whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal, the Fifth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court’s Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.
decision and applied the well-pleaded complaint rule to ascertain
whether Scherbatskoy’s lawsuit arose under the federal patent laws:
“[whether] the complaint include[d] allegations that federal patent
law create[d] the cause of action or federal patent law [was] a
necessary element of the claim.”152 The Fifth Circuit observed that
resolution of Scherbatskoy’s contract claim “implicates the federal
patent laws” because Scherbatskoy’s complaint alleged “Halliburton
breached the contract when it failed to pay additional royalties under
the Patent License Agreement after acquiring a new company, Smith
International, which, it is alleged, infringed the Scherbatskoys’
patents.”153 Thus, “determining whether Smith International infringed
the Scherbatskoys’ patents is a necessary element to recovery of
additional royalties or a finding that Halliburton breached the Patent
License Agreement. Both issues require the application of the federal
patent laws.”154 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the appeal and only the Federal Circuit
would have jurisdiction; the Fifth Circuit then transferred the case.155
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit also dismissed as “irrelevant” that the
summary judgment appeal did not explicitly address the patent issue
for jurisdiction purposes; the exclusive patent jurisdiction for the
appeal rested with the Federal Circuit. 156
On the receiving end, the Federal Circuit also engaged in
jurisdictional analysis before it decided to accept the cases
transferred from the Seventh Circuit157 and the Fifth Circuit.158 For
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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example, in determining whether jurisdiction was proper for the
Federal Circuit to accept the case in Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co.,
the Federal Circuit also looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., which enunciated
that patent jurisdiction can only be extended in cases where either the
federal patent law creates the cause of action or where the plaintiff’s
claim depends on resolution of a substantial question of patent law.159
In addition, the Federal Circuit relied on its prior decisions, such as
Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic Design and Additive Controls v.
Flowdata, for guidance in deciding U.S. Valves v. Dray.160 The
Federal Circuit asserted jurisdiction in Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic
Design because it invoked patent law.161 In that case, the patentee
and its licensees were accused of committing a state tort of falsehood
through their assertion that they held exclusive rights in patents even
though the patents were invalid and unenforceable.162 The state’s
falsehood claim required the determination of whether the patents
were indeed invalid and unenforceable.163 Likewise, in Additive
Controls v. Flowdata, the Federal Circuit asserted jurisdiction over a
case where Additive claimed that Flowdata made false accusations
that Additive infringed on Flowdata’s patent in violation of the
state’s business disparagement law.164 Determining whether
Flowdata’s statement was false would require a determination of
non-infringement of the patent at issue.165
In applying Christianson’s teachings and the Hunter Douglas and
Additive Controls decisions, the Federal Circuit in U.S. Valves v.
Dray noted that the present case contained a substantial issue of
federal patent law under the well-pleaded complaint rule that would
warrant the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.166 Specifically, the license
158.
1999).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., No. 98-1290, 1999 WL 13377, at *2–4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11,
Id. at *3 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988)).
U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372.
Id.
Id. (discussing Hunter Douglas v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
Id.
Id. (discussing Additive Controls v. Flowdata, 986 F.2d 476 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
Id.
U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372 (“As in Hunter Douglas and Additive, this case contains a

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/1

24

Nguyen: Judicial Wisdom or Patent Envy?

2016]

JUDICIAL WISDOM OR PATENT ENVY

327

agreement between U.S. Valves and Dray provided U.S. Valves “an
exclusive right to manufacture, use, sell, advertise, and distribute the
Licensed Product.”167 To establish that Dray sold valves in violation
of U.S. Valves’ exclusive rights to such sales, the court found that
“U.S. Valves must show that Dray sold valves that were covered by
the licensed patents.”168 This would require the court to interpret and
construct patent claim terms and then determine whether the valves
infringed the licensed patents.169 In other words, patent law was
substantial and a necessary element of U.S. Valves’ breach of
contract action.170
In summary, U.S. Valves and Scherbatskoy represent a “case
within a case” that the state cause of action requires a determination
of patent infringement, non-infringement, invalidity, or enforceability
under the well-pleaded rule.171 The patent issue was substantial and
necessary to ascertaining whether there was a violation of state
law.172 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have
established their own precedents in this area, in agreement with the
Federal Circuit’s case law, and transferred cases to the Federal
Circuit.173
The Eleventh Circuit ignored the established precedents and
openly contradicted the Fifth, Seventh, and Federal Circuits.
Although the decision in U.S. Valves v. Dray explicitly acknowledges
that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim required resolution of the
patent infringement claim where the licensed patents covered the
defendant’s newly developed products, the Eleventh Circuit
disregarded precedents and proceeded to engage in the two steps of

substantial issue of federal patent law.”).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 599 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(discussing cases deemed as a “case within a case” that would present a substantial patent question for
jurisdictional purpose).
172. U.S. Valves, 190 F.3d at 813–14; Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., No. 98-1290, 1999 WL
13377, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 1999).
173. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 1999) (transferring the case to the Federal
Circuit); Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997).
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patent infringement analysis.174 The Eleventh Circuit engaged in
patent claim construction and infringement analysis under literal
infringement and the doctrine of equivalents.175 The Eleventh Circuit
then concluded that no patent infringement existed and, therefore, no
breach of the license agreement occurred.176 Clearly, the patent law
issue was substantial and a necessary element in the contract claim.
Yet, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the patent law issue was not
substantial to the contract claim because its “resolution of this
question [was] unlikely to control any future cases.”177 Due to “the
fact-bound nature” of the patent question and “the small likelihood
that the resolution” of the patent infringement would “impact future
cases,” the Eleventh Circuit stated that it could not “conclude that the
issue of patent infringement presented by [the plaintiff] is a
‘substantial question’ of federal [patent] law.”178 Simply, the
Eleventh Circuit grabbed appellate jurisdiction when it had no
authority under the law. The Eleventh Circuit’s conduct and
justification are directly in conflict with the Seventh, Fifth, and
Federal Circuits under the well-pleaded complaint doctrine for patent
cases.179
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s belief that its claim construction,
with primary reliance on general dictionaries and expert testimony,
will not impact future cases ignores the obvious consequences of its
decision. It destroys uniformity in claim construction, one of the most
important areas of substantive patent law.180 It also opens the door for
forum shopping to manipulate outcomes.181
174.
175.
176.
177.

MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 842. The Eleventh Circuit further justified its decision that:
All of the relevant parties are joined in this lawsuit and will be bound by the
decision regarding the RS 3400. Both the highly specialized nature of patent
claims and the niche market for blood irradiator devices suggest that the
resolution of this issue is unlikely to impact any future constructions of claims.

Id.
178. Id. at 843.
179. Compare id., with Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 1997), and
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
180. See supra notes 114–15.
181. Id.
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C. Disregard for the Supreme Court’s Teaching
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in MDS (Canada), Inc. v. Rad
Source Technologies, Inc. also disregarded the Supreme Court’s
mandate in Christianson.182 The Supreme Court, in addition to
instructing courts on the well-pleaded complaint rule, mandated that
courts follow the “age-old” rule—”that a court may not in any case,
even in the interest of justice, extend its jurisdiction where none
exists”—because not following this rule “has always worked
injustice in particular cases.”183 The Eleventh Circuit ignored
Christianson with regard to both the well-pleaded complaint rule and
the mandate.
In Christianson, plaintiff Colt brought a state claim of trade secret
misappropriation against its former employee, Christianson, and
others.184 The defendants claimed that (1) Colt’s patents were invalid
for failure to disclose enablement and best mode information and that
(2) the “trade secrets” that the patents should have disclosed lost any
state protection because Colt had benefits from owning invalid
patents.185 Consequently, the defendants asserted they did not
misappropriate Colt’s trade secrets because the “trade secrets” had no
protection.186 The Federal Circuit initially declined to exercise
jurisdiction because the patent issue was not a substantial and
necessary element of plaintiff’s trade secret misappropriation
claim.187 The Seventh Circuit also declined to exercise jurisdiction.188
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that no patent
jurisdiction existed because the case did not arise under patent law
due to the plaintiff’s complaint never suggesting patents and the
defendant’s defense raising a theory of invalidity.189 In summary, the
182. Compare MDS (Can.) Inc., 720 F.3d at 841, with Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988), and Christianson, 798 F.2d at 1052.
183. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818.
184. Id. at 804–06.
185. Id. at 806.
186. Id.
187. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1549–60 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(discussing the numerous times retransferring between the Federal Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, as
neither circuit believed that it had jurisdiction).
188. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1052 (7th Cir. 1986).
189. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborer’s
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Supreme Court established that patent law jurisdiction extends only
to cases where (1) federal patent law provides a cause of action or (2)
the plaintiff’s right to relief “necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal patent law.”190 The Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff’s trade secrets violation claim did not raise a
substantial question of patent law or that the patent was a necessary
element of the plaintiff’s claim.191
Applying the rule and rationale mandated by Christianson, the
Federal Circuit should have exclusive jurisdiction over MDS
(Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies, Inc. because the
plaintiff’s claim of breach of contract depends on the resolution of
whether the defendant’s products are covered under the patents stated
in the contract.192 The patent question was substantial and necessary
in resolving the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against the
defendants for manufacturing devices covered by the licensed
patents. The Eleventh Circuit ignored precedents and grabbed
jurisdiction where it did not have it, contrary to decisions rendered by
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits.193 In so doing, it violated the age-old
rule mandated by Christianson that regional circuit courts must
refrain from exerting jurisdiction when jurisdiction does not exist, to
avoid “working injustice” in the case.194 The injustice in MDS
includes fracturing the structured claim construction rules and
inviting forum shopping for claim construction rules favorable to
influence litigation outcomes.

Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (“[W]hether a claim ‘arises under’ patent law ‘must be
determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim in the bill or
declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the
defendant may interpose’ . . . . Thus, a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason
alone, ‘arise under’ patent law, ‘even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if
both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.”).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 810.
192. See infra Part IV. In recent years, the Supreme Court has addressed jurisdiction issue in legal
malpractice in patent cases. Id. In these types of cases, the patent issue is not substantial because it is
hypothetical in nature. Id.
193. See supra Part I.
194. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818.
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D. Violating a Congressional Act
By asserting appellate jurisdiction over a case where patent law is
a substantial question of the plaintiff’s claim, the Eleventh Circuit
also violated Congress’s intent in vesting the Federal Circuit with
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to hear patent cases in whole or in
part under 28 U.S.C. § 1338195 that “arise under” patent law.196
Congress created the Federal Circuit under the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982.197 As stated in the legislative document,
Congress created the Federal Circuit to end forum shopping, the
widespread lack of uniformity, and the uncertainty of legal doctrine
in patent law.198 The Eleventh Circuit’s claim construction to
ascertain the ordinary meaning of claim terms with primary reliance
on expert testimony and two general dictionaries, Oxford and
Merriam-Webster, directly contradicted the Federal Circuit’s
precedents on claim construction for ordinary meaning of claim
terms.199 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision injects uncertainty, causes
195. Congress set forth the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction via 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) to be
read jointly with Section 1338:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction—(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district court . . . if the
jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section 1346 of [28
U.S.C.], except that jurisdiction of an appeal in a case brought in a district court
under section 1346(a)(1), 1346(b), 1346(e), or 1346(f) of this title, or under
section 1346(a)(2) when the claim is founded upon an Act of Congress or a
regulation of an executive department providing for internal revenue shall be
governed by sections 1291, 1292, and 1294 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act subsequently changed the
jurisdictional provisions. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
196. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 41 (1981) (stating that the cases fall within the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive patent jurisdiction “in the same sense that cases are said to ‘arise under’ federal law
for purposes of federal question jurisdiction”). In the recent overhaul of patent law, Congress has
expanded the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to cover compulsory counterclaims. See also 28
U.S.C. § 1295 (2012); discussion infra Part IV.
197. See generally Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in
a Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 529 (2004)
(providing a brief history of the creation of the Federal Circuit).
198. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981) (stating that one Congress’s objectives when creating the
Federal Circuit was “to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that
exist[ed] in the administration of patent law,” and that such uniformity will “eliminate the expensive,
time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation in the field”); see also
Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 259–60 (2003) (tracing the creation of the Federal Circuit).
199. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 846–48 (11th Cir. 2013).
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the lack of uniformity as to the rules of claim construction, and opens
the door for forum shopping. Simply, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
violates a congressional act and Congress’s intent behind that act,
regardless of whether it legitimately had appellate jurisdiction.
III. NEW RESPONSES FROM THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
While the Eleventh Circuit grabbed patent jurisdiction without
authority, the Seventh Circuit grabbed the public’s attention through
its Chief Judge’s speech, “Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?”200 Whether the speech was
“elegant,”201 “colorful,”202 or an “unconventional” blending of the
Dixie Chicks, Robin Thicke and Burt Bacharach,203 the Chief Judge
for the Seventh Circuit emphatically wants to end the Federal
Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction in patent cases. The Chief Judge
asserted that exclusive jurisdiction in the name of legal uniformity is
harmful to the patent system because it lacks opportunities for
percolation before it reaches the Supreme Court,204 and it lacks
multiple judicial perspectives from sister circuits.205
200. Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23.
201. Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court”: A Newly Robust Ecosystem, 13 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 386, 386 (2014).
202. See Reines, supra note 12.
203. Timothy B. Lee, The Dixie Chicks and Robin Thicke Explain How to Fix the Patent System,
WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/07/the-dixiechicks-and-robin-thicke-explain-how-to-fix-the-patent-system/.
204. Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23. On percolation, the Chief Judge asserted as follows, along
with borrowing the Dixie Chick’s chorus of the song “Wide Open Spaces”:
The virtues of uniformity have their limits. No one wants to live in an echo
chamber, and no thinker or innovator will get very far surrounded by a bunch of
yes-men. The Supreme Court learns valuable lessons about which cases are the
hardest, and which are most worthy of certiorari, by watching the development
and resolution of conflicts in the circuits or the state supreme courts. Patent law,
too, needs “wide open spaces / room to make [its] big mistakes.” Mistakes teach
valuable lessons; they can reveal where the cracks in the foundation are and how
they should be fixed. A proposition that seems obvious to one person might seem
questionable to another, ambiguous to a third, and flatly wrong to a fourth. As in
the song, percolation is needed despite (or maybe because of) the high stakes.
Id. at 4 (quoting DIXIE CHICKS, WIDE OPEN SPACES).
205. Id. The Chief Judge argued that a specialized patent court is not needed because the doctrines
between patent and other types of intellectual property are “blurred” and regional circuits are
accustomed in handling these doctrines. Id. at 7. Also, the multiple perspectives from circuits are crucial
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As expected, the Chief Judge’s statement attracted attention from
mainstream media,206 blogs,207 and academic symposiums.208 Some
viewed the statement as a “frontal assault”209 while others praised the
importance of the statement and the prominence of the speaker to
address patent jurisdiction.210 Many have articulated responses to the
Chief Judge’s statement by proposing ways to enhance the
percolation211 and competition to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction in patent cases.212
to the development of patent law, for example, non-obviousness:
Again, this is an area where several circuits’ elaboration of competing viewpoints
might prove useful: perhaps there are different ways, better ways, to approach
non-obviousness. Speaking from my own experience, I can assure you that circuit
splits and disagreements with colleagues force judges to sharpen their writing,
push them to defend their positions, and from time to time persuade them that
someone else’s perspective is preferable. This process of testing and
experimentation is lost when uniformity is privileged above all other values.
Id. at 5.
206. Ashby Jones, Critics Fault Court’s Grip on Appeals for Patents: Calls to Loosen Federal
Circuit’s Hold Grows Amid Complaints Over Rulings, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2014, 7:10 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/critics-fault-courts-grip-on-appeals-for-patents-1404688219.
207. See generally Lance Duroni, Fed. Circ.’s Reign Over Patents Should End, Judge Says, LAW360
(Sept. 26, 2013, 9:35 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/474687/fed-circ-s-reign-over-patentsshould-end-judge-says; Robert Williams, Should Patent Law Jurisdiction Be Spread Around?, PAT. L.
BLOG (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.rtt-law.com/blogs/patent-law/should-patent-law-jurisdiction-bespread-around/.
208. See Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23.
209. Harold C. Wegner, Federal Circuit Exclusive Appellate Patent Jurisdiction: A Response to Chief
Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 394, 394 (2014).
210. Lee, supra note 203 (“Wood’s use of song lyrics may have been fanciful, but her advocacy for
curbing the Federal Circuit’s power over patent law is deadly serious. Academics have long advocated
reining in the Federal Circuit. But having a jurist of Wood’s stature back the idea will give it greater
credibility.”).
211. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350, 351–52
(2014). Paul R. Gugliuzza offered his counter-argument to the Chief Judge’s lack of percolation
argument:
Judge Wood suggests that, due to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction,
patent doctrine is insufficiently “percolated,” meaning that it lacks mechanisms
through which case law can be critiqued, reexamined, tested, and corrected, and
issues worthy of Supreme Court review can be flagged. Yet percolating forces do
exist in the patent system. For example, in the Federal Circuit, dissents critiquing
existing doctrine are frequent and often lead to en banc proceedings reexamining
and sometimes correcting the doctrine at issue. In addition, the Supreme Court,
federal district courts, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Patent and
Trademark Office, among others, all provide, through various channels, diverse
and influential perspectives that prevent patent law from becoming stale.
Id. On “percolation,” Professor Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss argues that now that a degree of nationwide
uniformity in patent law has been achieved, it would be a pity to disrupt it. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit: A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J.
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As of today, the Seventh Circuit has not acted on its Chief Judge’s
demand for a share of the Federal Circuit’s patent docket.213 The
Seventh Circuit has not overturned its precedent of declining
jurisdiction when the patent question is substantial to the plaintiff’s
claim under the well-pleaded complaint rule, nor has it followed the
Eleventh Circuit’s lead in MDS.214 Instead, the Seventh Circuit’s
Chief Judge generated public attention without actually grabbing
jurisdiction.215 The Seventh Circuit invited litigants to seek its
appellate jurisdiction by announcing that it is ready and able to
handle complex cases.216 Whether the Seventh Circuit will exercise
restraint or heed the Chief Judge’s statement remains to be seen.
IV. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR CIRCUIT COURTS’ RESPONSES
What could explain the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to grab
jurisdiction in a patent claim construction and infringement case?
What could explain the Seventh Circuit Chief Judge’s attention
grabbing statement? Do they have judicial wisdom to offer or are
they envious of the Federal Circuit’s rising prominence? Perhaps the

INTELL. PROP. 327, 330–48 (2014). While Chief Judge Wood is right that the law would improve with
percolation, a change in the composition of the court, new procedures for challenging patents in the
Patent and Trademark Office, a district court pilot program, and satellite patent offices will bring to the
debate new voices, different kinds of expertise, and diverse experience. It is worth waiting to see how
these changes play out. Id.
212. Professor Rai believes that:
[C]ompetition [to the Federal Circuit’s exclusive patent jurisdiction] is indeed
desirable. Whether such competition is best provided through additional appellate
courts is unclear, however. In any event, given our current structure, the more
tractable approach is to improve competitive input from sources that have already
emerged. These include dissenting Federal Circuit judges, parties and amici who
are not “patent insiders,” and perhaps, above all, the executive branch.
Rai, supra note 201, at 387.
213. A search in Westlaw database for patent decisions in the Seventh Circuit yields none, as of
January 25, 2015.
214. XCO Int’l Inc. v. Pac. Sci. Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “if Pac-Sci were
challenging in a complaint for breach of contract the validity of an issued patent, this appeal would have
to go to the Federal Circuit rather than to this court”) (citing U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811,
813–14 (7th Cir. 1999)).
215. See Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23, at 6–7.
216. Id. at 10.
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explanations are grounded in both judicial wisdom and patent envy,
if any explanation exists at all.
A. Judicial Wisdom and Patent Envy: Patents Are Common Today
In 1982, when Congress created the Federal Circuit, 63,276 patents
were granted.217 Patent law practice during this time was the
“backwater” in the legal profession.218 More recently, in 2013 the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) granted
302,948 patents. That is almost a 500% increase from 1982.219 Patent
litigation and patent issues have become common headlines.220 Patent
law practice is now part of several national law firms, generating
handsome fees.221 Patent issues appear in daily newspapers and
permeate the blogosphere.222 Patents are everywhere.223
217. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2014, supra note 7.
218. See Reines, supra note 12 (“Although historically patent law was considered an esoteric
backwater, it is now recognized as a dynamic legal field involving fascinating subjects and great
financial stakes. Our world is filled with amazing new inventions that improve the way we work, how
we are entertained, and our healthcare. Patent appeals now attract the finest advocates and garner
national media attention.”).
219. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2014, supra note 7.
220. Media, from the local newspaper to National Geographic, cover patent issues. See, e.g., Melinda
Johnston, Stallings Inventor Brian Conti Gains National Attention, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov.
15, 2014, 12:00 AM) http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2014/11/15/5314841/stallings-inventor-brianconti.html#.VJznwV4C4; Ker Than, 7 Takeaways From Supreme Court’s Gene Patent Decision, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC, June 15, 2013, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/06/130614-supreme-courtgene-patent-ruling-human-genome-science/. Patent issues are discussed from the White House to the
state house. See Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to Protect American Innovation, THE WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patenttrolls-protect-american-innovation; see also Patent Trolling, STATE OF VERMONT (July 25, 2014),
http://ago.vermont.gov/hot-topics/patent-trolling1.php.
221. See Best Law Firms for Patent Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
http://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/patent-law (last visited Jan. 8, 2016); GARY A. MUNNEKE, THE LEGAL
CAREER GUIDE: FROM LAW STUDENT TO LAWYER 152 (4th ed. 2002) (“Patent law, once thought of as
the backwater of legal practice, has become one of the hottest areas of practice with the explosion of
technology in the world.”).
222. Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Ponders Trademark Odyssey of Sealtight vs. Sealtite, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 2, 2014, 5:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/tag/patent-and-trademark-office/; see also Brian
Palmer, Jonas Salk: Good for Virology, Bad at Economics, SLATE, Apr. 13, 2014,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/history_of_innovation/2014/04/the_real_reasons_jonas_salk_d
idn_t_patent_the_polio_vaccine.html.
223. Patents are covered in radio. See, e.g., This American Life: When Patents Attack, WBEZ RADIO
(July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
Patents are also covered in business papers. See, e.g., Steve Ivey, Making Their Mark: Louisville Patent
Attorneys Play Key Roles in Invention Process, LOUISVILLE BUS. FIRST (May 27, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/print-edition/2011/05/27/making-their-mark-louisville-
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The Federal Circuit has enjoyed its expansive influence and has
“become the envy of the system”224 with the rise in patent
prominence. Its exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeal cases
propels its unique role in the public eye.225 Established print sources,
electronic media, and blogs vie to cover its latest decisions in patent
cases.226 Some judges in the Federal Circuit sought the limelight,
perhaps a little too much.227 Lawyers also brag about their alliances
with the Federal Circuit.228 Furthermore, the clubby atmosphere has
attracted unwanted attention and criticism.229
patent.html?page=all. Patents are also covered in specialized daily articles. See, e.g., Patent Output from
the National Institutes of Health Vital to Understanding America’s Innovation Economy, SCIENCE
DAILY (June 9, 2014), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/06/140609153512.htm. Patents are
covered in newswire. See, e.g., CLIO USA: Procter & Gamble Suffers a Legal Setback in its
Questionable Patent Claims involving Teeth Whiteners, PR NEWSWIRE (July 3, 2014),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/clio-usa-procter—gamble-suffers-a-legal-setback-in-itsquestionable-patent-claims-involving-teeth-whiteners-265675701.html. Lastly, patents are covered in
national patent strategy papers. See, e.g., National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020), N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 2010), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy
.pdf.
224. See Reines, supra note 12 (“In many ways, the Federal Circuit’s patent docket has become the
envy of the system.”); see also Maggie Tamburro, Comment to The “Almighty” Federal Circuit
Evolving? Patent Policy & Jurisprudence, IMS EXPERTSERVICES (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.imsexpertservices.com/bullseye/january-2013/the-almighty-federal-circuit-evolving-patent-policyjurisprudence/.
225. The Federal Circuit itself is keenly aware of its rising importance. See, e.g., Hon. Kathleen M.
O’Malley, Interesting Times at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 949, 956 (2014). Moreover, an
empirical study has confirmed that the “district courts treat the Federal Circuit as more authoritative
(compared to the Supreme Court) on patent law, than they treat the regional circuits (compared to the
Supreme Court) on copyright law.” David Pekarek-Krohn & Emerson H. Tiller, Federal Circuit Patent
Precedent: An Empirical Study of Institutional Authority and IP Ideology 3 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of L.
Scholarly Commons, Working Paper No. 42, 2010).
226. Tamburro, supra note 224; CLIO USA, supra note 223.
227. Ashby Jones & Brent Kendall, Top Judge Who Gave Lawyer Praise Recuses Himself From
Patent Cases, Laudatory Email Raises Questions About Patent Bar, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2014, 5:50
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303980004579578452919038262; see also Dan
Levine, Insight: Rocker Judge Juggles Tech Policy, Supreme Court and the Stones, REUTERS, Dec. 11,
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/us-usa-judge-rader-insight-idUSBRE9BA06
D20131211.
228. Jones & Kendall, supra note 227. For example, one prominent patent attorney, Mr. Edward
Reines, attempted to capitalize on his relationship with Judge Rader, then Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit. Id. Mr. Reines “chaired the Federal Circuit Advisory Council, a group of prominent patent
lawyers that serve as a liaison between the court and the patent bar. Judge Rader appointed him to the
position.” Id.
229. Id. (describing the clubby atmosphere between the Federal Circuit and the patent bar). The recent
email controversy in the Federal Circuit has attracted attention from the Wall Street Journal and the
ABA to Above the Law blog. See Ashby Jones, Email Controversy Leads to Reprimand of Weil Gotshal
Patent Lawyer, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/11/05/
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Hardly any other district court or circuit court has shared the same
level of prominence in such a short period: a little more than thirty
years from creation.230 More patents being granted by the USPTO
means an increase in volume of patent litigation cases filed in district
courts231 and higher numbers of patent appeals reviewed in the
Federal Circuit.232 Inevitably, the Federal Circuit continues to enjoy
its rise in stature.233 The sister circuit courts cannot do anything
because they have no authority to hear patent cases.234 As the Chief
Judge of the Seventh Circuit advocates for a share in patent cases in
the name of judicial wisdom—having different circuit courts to hear
patent appeals—the judicial wisdom argument runs hollow through
the lense of envy. The Eleventh Circuit leaped a step further, actually
grabbing patent jurisdiction instead of just demanding a share of

email-controversy-leads-to-reprimand-of-weil-gotshal-patent-lawyer/; see also David Lat, Federal
Circuit Benchslaps Prominent Patent Practitioner, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 5, 2014, 2:39 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/11/federal-circuit-benchslaps-prominent-patent-practitioner/; Martha Neil,
Federal Appeals Court Blasts Attorney for Forwarding Chief Judge’s Congratulatory Email, A.B.A. J.
(Nov. 5, 2014, 4:18 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
federal_appeals_court_scolds_prominent_patent_attorney_for_circulating_judg/.
230. If reversal rate by the Supreme Court is a measurement of stature, the Ninth Circuit leads the
pack with having the largest number of cases heard and reversed by the Supreme Court. See Circuit
Scorecard, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2014), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
SCOTUSblog_scorecard_OT13.pdf.
231. Chris Barry, Ronen Arad, Landan Ansell & Evan Clark, 2013 Patent Litigation Study: Big Cases
Make Headlines, While Patent Cases Proliferate, PWC (2013), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/
forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf (studying the increase in patent
cases filed in district courts); see also Lex Machina Releases First Annual Patent Litigation Year in
Review, LEX MACHINA (May 13, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machina-releases-firstannual-patent-litigation-review/ (comparing 6,092 new patent cases filed in 2013, a 12.4% increase from
2012).
232. Since 2011 the Federal Circuit saw an increase in the number of patent infringement appeals. See
Filings of Patent Infringement Appeals from the U.S. District Courts, supra note 5. Patent cases from
the district courts, the USPTO, and the ITC comprises a total of 48% of all cases in the Federal Circuit
during FY2013. See Appeals Filed, by Category FY 2013, United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, http:www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/fy%2013%20filings
%20by%20category.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
233. A national newspaper has observed that the Federal Circuit’s profile “has skyrocketed in recent
years, alongside the rise of big-dollar patent disputes, such as those between technology giants Apple
Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co.” Jones & Kendall, supra note 227.
234. Sister circuit courts routinely transfer cases involving patents as substantial question to the
Federal Circuit. See, e.g., USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 647 F.3d 274, 277–80 (5th Cir. 2011);
U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 190 F.3d 811, 813–14 (7th Cir. 1999).
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patent appeals, and now watching the fiasco of consequences cascade
down from MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Technologies.235
The only court that can legitimately hear patent cases on appeals
other than the Federal Circuit is the court of last resort, the Supreme
Court of the United States.236 The Supreme Court has also tried its
best to inject itself into patent cases by accepting an unusually high
number of patent cases in recent years, while the total certiorari grant
for all cases has decreased.237 The rise of patents and their
importance guarantees that Supreme Court patent decisions will
generate media coverage.238 However, sharing the limelight has its
own cost; with its lack of patent law expertise, the Supreme Court
has seen its own setbacks and has endured ridicule for ignorance of
patent law in some instances.239

235. MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 841 (11th Cir. 2013).
236. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 657 (2009).
237. See Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court Versus Patent Law, LINKEDIN (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140403210921-2503830-supreme-court-versus-patent-law; Ryan J.
Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1219, 1229 (2012).
238. See generally Noah Feldman, Ready for a Patented Supreme Court Smackdown?, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Oct. 15, 2014, 5:01 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-10-15/ready-for-apatented-supreme-court-smackdown; Mark Grabowski, Are Technical Difficulties at the Supreme Court
Causing a “Disregard of Duty”?, 3 J. L., TECH. & INTERNET 93, 93 (2011) (“Supreme Court Justices
lately have displayed a startling level of ignorance about computing and communication methods that
many Americans take for granted”); Brent Kendall, Akamai-Limelight Patent Case Goes Before Top
Court, Justices Consider Whether to Make It Easier to Hold Companies Liable for Encouraging
Infringement by Others, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303948104579534063156736196.
239. See Hon. Timothy B. Dyk, Does The Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U.L. REV. 763, 763
(2008) (“At any gathering of the [patent] bar, no tag line of a speech has more assurance of applause
than one that importunes the Supreme Court to keep its hands off the patent law.”). See also Courtenay
C. Brinckerhoff, Supreme Court Reverses Federal Circuit On Induced Infringement in Limelight
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: PHARMAPATENTS (June 2, 2014),
http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/2014/06/02/supreme-court-requires-direct-infringement-to-supportinduced-infringement-in-limelight-networks-inc-v-akamai-technologies-inc/ (“The Supreme Court
decision comes close to being openly disrespectful to the Federal Circuit.”); Jeff Guo, The Supreme
Court Reveals its Ignorance of Genetics, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 13, 2013,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113476/supreme-court-genetics-ruling-reveals-judges-ignorance;
Eric W. Guttag, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, IPWATCHDOG (July 25,
2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/25/ignorance-is-not-bliss-alice-corp-v-cls-bankinternational/id=50517/.
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B. Judicial Wisdom and Patent Envy: Lack of Multiple Perspectives
The Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit champions the view that
the development of patent law needs the assistance from the Seventh
Circuit and other sister circuits.240 The value of having multiple
perspectives is important for percolation of patent doctrines.241 In
other words, the Federal Circuit lacks the medium for percolation;
the Federal Circuit’s exclusivity cabins the development of patent
law. The lack of multiple perspectives results in a lack of judicial
wisdom.242
The judicial wisdom argument does not have much support, as
explained by scholars, and will not be repeated here.243 The judicial
wisdom argument, however, is clothed in patent envy disguised with
care. Again, it is understandable for circuit courts wanting to have
appellate jurisdiction to hear patent cases. The size of the patent pie
is getting too large compared to thirty-three years ago when the
Federal Circuit was first created.244 Not only growth in quantity or
size, but also the quality of the patent pie vis-à-vis patent importance
in the economy has prompted the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits to
grab attention and jurisdiction.245 Dismissing the patent envy
argument is easy to do, but the reality is that Circuits have taken steps
to keep the Federal Circuit from retaining exclusive patent
jurisdiction: the Eleventh Circuit has injected uncertainty in
substantive patent law in the area of claim construction, and the Chief
Judge of the Seventh Circuit has demanded a share of patent appeal
cases.246
240. Hon. Diane P. Wood, supra note 23.
241. Golden, supra note 236, at 673.
242. Timothy B. Lee conducted an interview on September 26, 2014, and received the following
comments from Robin Feldman, a critic of the Federal Circuit: “Without the disciplining effect of
frequent supervision or dialogue among other circuits, it’s difficult to avoid becoming insular. In other
words, problems at the Federal Circuit are structurally predictable.” Timothy B. Lee, Why the Supreme
Court Keeps Smacking Down America’s Top Patent Court, VOX (Sept. 26, 2014, 10:40 AM),
http://www.vox.com/2014/9/26/6846713/why-the-supreme-court-keeps-smacking-down-americas-toppatent-court.
243. See Harold C. Wegner, Federal Circuit Exclusive Appellate Patent Jurisdiction: A Response to
Chief Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 394, 401 (2014).
244. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963 – 2014, supra note 7.
245. See discussion supra note 223.
246. See MDS (Can.) Inc. v. Rad Source Tech., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 2013); Hon. Diane
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Whether judicial wisdom and patent envy are possible
explanations for the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits’ conduct, the
question remains: should patent appeals be decided by different
regional circuits and, if so, under what circumstances? If sound
reasons exist for the end of exclusive patent jurisdiction, regional
circuits must demonstrate that they are ready to analyze substantive
patent issues. If they exhibit conduct similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s
experiment in the MDS case, the end of patent law uniformity will
arrive in the midst of escalation in forum shopping.
V. TOWARD A MORE LEGITIMATE GROUND: FEDERALISM
PRINCIPLES
There is perhaps a more legitimate ground for regional circuit
courts to claim their share of the patent jurisdiction from the Federal
Circuit. Federalism is the driving force for obtaining their share of
jurisdiction.
A. Federalism Principles
Regional circuit courts can exert their jurisdiction over patent
cases under federalism principles.247 They can retain diversity
jurisdiction in cases of strong state interest that will not disrupt the
federal-state judicial balance. Specifically, regional circuit courts can
assert that the state has a strong responsibility in matters underlying
state claims that are intertwined with patents. Indeed, in addition to
requiring that the patent issue must be “actually disputed and
substantial,” the Supreme Court also instructed federal courts to exert
federal question jurisdiction over state claims only in rare cases
where doing so will not disturb “any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”248 In other

P. Wood, supra note 23.
247. Federalism in the United States is the legal relationship and distribution of power between the
federal government and state governments. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 729 (10th ed. 2014).
248. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
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words, federalism principles are important, and courts must adhere to
them as not to “upset the federal-state division of judicial labor.”249
Federalism separates two spheres, federal government and state
government, in the administering of governance as propounded in the
Constitution.250 State claims are in the provenance of state courts;251
federal courts must confine themselves to the jurisdiction “conferred
on it by Congress and permitted by the Constitution.”252 If litigants
bring state claims in federal courts based on diversity, regional circuit
courts will then have jurisdiction, even if the case may insubstantially
involve patent issues.253 Consequently, the Federal Circuit will have
no jurisdiction over the case.254 For example, in legal malpractice
cases where clients bring suits against their former lawyers for failure
to present certain defenses in an earlier patent infringement litigation,
the states have special responsibility for maintaining standards
among members of licensed professions, including the legal
profession.255 The federal system has no interest in interfering with
states’ interest in policing the licensed professions.256 Indeed, there is
249. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 313–14).
250. In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that federal courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction, must pay “due regard for the constitutional allocation of powers between the state and
federal systems [which] requires a federal court scrupulously to confine itself to the jurisdiction
conferred on it by Congress and permitted by the Constitution”); see also Singh v. Duane Morris LLP,
538 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing federalism and judicial responsibilities); Grable, 545 U.S.
at 313–14 (“[T]he federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is
consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal
courts . . . . ”).
251. See In re Carter, 618 F.2d at 1098.
252. Id.
253. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of
the United States . . . .”). A regional circuit has jurisdiction over appeals based on diversity jurisdiction
in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See, e.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (holding that the regional circuit court has jurisdiction over the appeal, not the
Federal Circuit court, because the claim did not arise under patent law).
254. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 819.
255. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S.
447, 460 (1978)); see also Singh, 538 F.3d at 339 (holding that legal malpractice claim in a trademark
case is within the jurisdiction of state courts, not federal courts because “federal jurisdiction over this
state-law malpractice claim would upend the balance between federal and state judicial
responsibilities”).
256. Singh, 538 F.3d at 339 (“Legal malpractice has traditionally been the domain of state law, and
federal law rarely interferes with the power of state authorities to regulate the practice of law.”).
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no federal law or policy imposing a mandate that states must
withdraw from policing licensed lawyers and that state courts have
no authority to preside over legal malpractice claims “simply because
they require resolution of a hypothetical patent issue.”257 Federalism
principles dictate that state claim in cases where the patent issue is
collateral fall within state courts’ jurisdictions,258 and state claims in
cases that rely on diversity jurisdiction fall within regional circuit
courts’ jurisdictions.
Ignoring federalism, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional overreach
in recent years on state claims,259 including legal malpractice cases,
has become a subject of criticism.260 Some courts have ridiculed the
Federal Circuit for its fundamental misunderstanding of federalism,
complaining that “under the Federal Circuit’s approach, the
federalism element is simply an invocation of the need for uniformity
in patent law.”261 Moreover, courts have said the Federal Circuit’s
approach is “disheartening given the potential consequences on the
division between state and federal courts beyond the purview of
patent disputes.”262 The Supreme Court has recently reigned in the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional overreach under federalism
principles.263 In other words, the Federal Circuit’s dated
interpretation of federalism is no longer legitimate.264 The Federal
257. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.
258. See, e.g., id.; Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 651–52 (Tex. 2011) (discussing federalism, the
division between federal and state courts, and that state courts have jurisdiction in a malpractice claim
because “the federal issue here is collateral, not basic” and the malpractice claim “does not impact any
live patent law claims”).
259. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791,
1803–04 (criticizing that the Federal Circuit has used its own framework of federalism to expand its
jurisdiction “over legal claims created by state law”); see also Singh, 538 F.3d at 339–40 (declining to
follow the Federal Circuit’s overreach in the state claims area because the Federal Circuit “did not
consider the reasons addressed here, involving the federal interest and the effect on federalism”).
260. See Gugliuzza, supra note 259, at 1810. Judge O’Malley has forcefully critiqued the Federal
Circuit for developing case law hoarding jurisdiction in cases of state concerns, as the case law “has
poisoned the well, and it will only serve to exacerbate the federalism concerns.” Byrne v. Wood, Herron
& Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
261. Minton, 355 S.W. 3d at 652.
262. Id. at 652–53 (Guzman, J., dissenting); see also Singh, 538 F.3d at 340.
263. See, e.g., Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.
264. Minton, 355 S.W.3d at 652 (observing that the Federal Circuit’s brand of federalism means for
“the benefits of a federal forum, the need for uniformity in patent law, and the fact that patents are
issued by a federal agency” and has “no consideration of what effect asserting exclusive federal
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Circuit must relinquish control over a case when there is no
justification to retain jurisdiction.265 Regional circuit courts can now
rely on federalism principles to retain diversity jurisdiction in cases
of strong state interest that will not disturb the balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.266
In summary, federalism is a cornerstone of the U.S. legal system.
The separation between state and federal systems is important to the
balance of all branches of government. Division between state and
federal courts means that not every case mentioning patents should
automatically provide a ground for the Federal Circuit to assert its
jurisdiction. Neither the Federal Circuit nor any other circuit court
should overreach its jurisdictional authority.
B. Patent Issues are Non-substantial and Hypothetical
Regional circuit courts can also retain jurisdiction in cases where
patent issues are intertwined with state claim issues, as long as the
patent issues are non-substantial and hypothetical. The patent legal
malpractice cases are not the same type of cases governed by the
well-pleaded complaint rule under Christianson.267 For example, in a
legal malpractice case stemming from the lawyer’s representation in
a prior patent litigation, the patent issue is typically non-substantial
and the consequence of what the lawyer has allegedly failed to do is
hypothetical in nature.268 Regarding the state’s interest, however, in
legal malpractice for regulating the legal profession, it is paramount
that state courts and not federal courts decide.269 Undoubtedly, if the
jurisdiction would have over the balance between the state and federal judiciaries intended by
Congress.”) (citing Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d
1262, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
265. Id.
266. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (“[T]he
question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and
substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities”).
267. See, e.g., Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1034–36 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(O’Malley, J., dissenting) (observing a number of legal malpractice cases involving patent issues are not
substantial and pose no serious threat to the uniformity of patent law).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1038 (noting that in patent-related legal malpractice cases, “states undoubtedly have a
strong interest and role in regulating the conduct of all of their respective attorneys, as well as in
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case is in federal court due to diversity jurisdiction,270 the regional
circuits will have appellate jurisdiction.271
The Federal Circuit has overreached its “patent hand” and retained
jurisdiction in patent-related legal malpractice cases under the
rhetoric of patent uniformity and substantiality, causing disarray in
this area.272 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Gunn v.
Minton, gave order to this disarray where legal malpractice is
intertwined with patent issues.273 In Gunn, Vernon Minton was a
computer programmer who developed a program for securities
trading and obtained a patent for his invention in 2000.274 In 1995,
prior to filing for patent protection, Minton leased his computer
program to TEXCEN, a securities brokerage.275 Minton then asserted
a patent infringement claim against NASDAQ and others.276
NASDAQ raised a defense that Minton’s patent was invalid under
the “on sale” bar, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), because he released
his program to the TEXCEN securities brokerage more than one year
before he sought patent protection.277 Minton argued that what he
leased to TEXCEN was different from his patent, but the district
court rejected his argument and granted NASDAQ summary
judgment.278 Minton then requested reconsideration from the district
court based on an argument raised for the first time that his release of
the program was within the “experimental use” exception to the “on

protecting all of their residents from negligent legal services”).
270. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (diversity jurisdiction).
271. Court Role and Structure, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/court-role-and-structure (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
272. Byrne, 676 F.3d at 1031–33 (explaining how the Federal Circuit has shaped its precedents in
reaching jurisdiction over legal malpractice cases and the precedents have been “out of step with that of
other federal and state courts.”); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 259, at 1815–19 (observing the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdictional expansion in recent years).
273. See Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013) (finding that malpractice claims involving
patent issues only if it “raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal
forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state
responsibilities”) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005)).
274. Id. at 1062.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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sale” bar.279 The district court denied the reconsideration motion as
untimely, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.280
Thereafter, Minton brought a legal malpractice suit against his
lawyer, Gunn, for failure to timely raise the experimental use
exception that may have resulted in the invalidation of his patent and
the loss in his prior patent infringement suit against NASDAQ.281
Gunn moved for summary judgment upon a showing that Minton’s
release of the program was not an experimental use, meaning the
experimental use exception would have failed in the patent lawsuit,
regardless of whether the exception was timely raised.282 Minton then
appealed the legal malpractice action and argued that his malpractice
claim arose under federal patent law, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which
provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction over “any claim for relief
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.”283 Minton
asserted that, as a result, the Texas state court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over his case.284 Minton wanted his legal malpractice
case heard anew in federal court.285 The Texas Court of Appeals,
however, affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment decision and
held that the federal interests in Minton’s state claim of legal
malpractice were not sufficiently substantial for jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a).286 The case then reached the Supreme Court of
Texas.287 That Court, relying on two Federal Circuit decisions on
similar facts, reversed the Texas Court of Appeals.288 Subsequently,
the Supreme Court of the United States accepted review.289

279. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062–63.
280. Id. at 1063.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1063.
286. Id. The Texas Court of Appeals applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s test in Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc.,v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), to determine when a state law claim may give
rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
287. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011).
288. Id. The Texas Supreme Court relied on Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss
Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski,
LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007), to reach its decision. Id. at 641–42
289. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its precedent test for
determining when federal jurisdiction over a state claim implicates a
federal issue or when a state claim is “arising under” federal
jurisdiction: “if a federal issue is (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by
Congress.”290 Applying the four-part test, the Gunn Court concluded
that resolution of the experimental use exception to the on sale bar
was “necessary” to Minton’s legal malpractice because he had to
establish that he would have prevailed in his patent infringement suit
against NASDAQ if his lawyer, Gunn, had timely raised the
exception.291 Also, the federal issue was “actually disputed” because
Minton and Gunn disputed on the merits whether the experimental
use exception would apply to rescue Minton’s patent infringement
case against NASDAQ.292 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that
the federal issue in this case was “not substantial in the relevant
sense.”293 The Supreme Court required that “the substantiality
inquiry . . . looks instead to the importance of the issue to the federal
system as a whole.”294
The Supreme Court cited two examples of a federal issue that was
“substantial” enough to “the federal system as a whole” to trigger
federal jurisdiction over a state claim. The first instance is where the
issue was federally imposed notice requirements prior to the IRS’s
seizure and sale of property, which the government has a “strong
interest” to validly recover delinquent taxes through seizure and sale
of property.295 The second instance is where the case depends upon
the determination of “the constitutional validity of an act of Congress
which is directly drawn in question.”296

290. Id. at 1065.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1065–66.
293. Id. at 1066.
294. Id.
295. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1066 (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.
308, 310–11 (2005)).
296. Id. (citing Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921)).
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The Supreme Court distinguished the facts in Gunn from the two
classic examples above because the federal issue in the present case
“carries no such significance.”297 It failed the “substantiality inquiry”
due to “the backward-looking nature of a legal malpractice claim,”
because the question is “posed in a merely hypothetical sense.”298
Regardless of how state courts resolve the hypothetical case of
whether patent infringement would have been found if “Minton’s
lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use argument,” the
resolution would “not change the real-world result of the prior federal
patent litigation.”299 Most importantly, state courts resolving legal
malpractice cases intertwined with patent issues will not undermine
“the development of a uniform body of [patent] law.”300
The new order from Gunn is clear: no federal jurisdiction exists
over a state claim where the federal issue is not substantial,
particularly in patent-related legal malpractice cases.301 That means
state courts will preside over these types of cases, and higher-level
state courts will have appellate jurisdiction. Regional federal circuit
courts will have appellate jurisdiction to preside over these types of
cases only if diversity jurisdiction exists in the district court.302 Also,
the Supreme Court recognized in Gunn v. Minton that state courts can
have jurisdiction in cases where the patent issue is intertwined with
state claims, as long as state courts’ decisions have no real-world
impact on, and do not undermine the development of, a uniform body
of patent law.303 In other words, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
mandate for the development of a uniform body of patent law is an
important federal interest.304 Consequently, if regional circuit courts
have appellate jurisdiction over these types of state claims
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1066–67.
299. Id. at 1067.
300. Id. at 1067 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)).
301. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067.
302. See generally USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 541 F. App’x 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2013)
(retaining jurisdiction through diversity because the “hypothetical patent issues between the parties to
this case are fact-specific and of no importance to the federal system” as a whole, as required for
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit).
303. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067.
304. See id.

Published by Reading Room, 2016

45

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1

348

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

intertwined with a patent issue due to diversity jurisdiction, the patent
issue must not be a substantial issue in that the circuit courts’
decisions and must not undermine the development of a uniform
body of patent law.305
Moreover, in applying the Supreme Court’s mandate in Gunn to
breach of patent license agreement cases that require resolution of
whether the defendant’s products are covered by the licensed patent,
the patent question is substantial because it satisfies Gunn’s
“substantiality inquiry.” The resolution of such cases require the
court to engage in patent claim construction and infringement
analysis in order to determine the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim
against the defendant for violating contract provisions covered by the
licensed patents. Additionally, the uniform development of patent
claim construction and infringement analysis is of paramount
importance to federal courts. Without having consistent rules in these
two key features of all patent cases, uncertainty and forum shopping
problems will once again plague the patent system. In other words,
patent claim construction and infringement analyses are not
“hypothetical”306 without “real-world effect[s].”307 This is evidenced
by Congress purposely creating the Federal Circuit to end uncertainty
and forum shopping and to create a uniform patent system where
patent claim construction and infringement analysis are at the center
of patent issues.308 Consequently, under Gunn, regional circuit courts
will not have jurisdiction to hear well-pleaded complaint cases where
the patent question is substantial, as seen in U.S. Valves and
Scherbatskoy.

305. See, e.g., Cty. Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 2007)
(addressing underlying issues of patent law to resolve a state-law malpractice claim).
306. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1068 (“We have no reason to suppose that Congress—in establishing exclusive federal
jurisdiction over patent cases—meant to bar from state courts state legal malpractice claims simply
because they require resolution of a hypothetical patent issue.”).
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C. Patent Counterclaims, Not Compulsory Counterclaims
Another opportunity for regional circuits to extend jurisdiction in
cases involving patents presents itself if the patent claims are
counterclaims. If the patent counterclaims are compulsory, the
Federal Circuit will have exclusive jurisdiction, marking a change
from prior law.309
In its recent major overhaul of patent law, Congress amended
patent jurisdiction statutory provisions.310 Congress provided that the
Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction from a final
decision of a federal district court in any civil action arising under
patent statutes.311 Also, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
309. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2003) (holding that
patent compulsory counterclaims do not serve as the basis for federal courts’ “arising under
jurisdiction”). Specifically, the Vornado court explained:
[W]hether a case arises under federal patent law “cannot depend upon the
answer.” . . . It follows that a counterclaim—which appears as part of the
defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the
basis for “arising under” jurisdiction.
Allowing a counterclaim to establish “arising under” jurisdiction
would also contravene the longstanding policies underlying our precedents. First,
since the plaintiff is “the master of the complaint,” the well-pleaded complaint
rule enables him, by eschewing claims based on federal law . . . to have the cause
heard in state court. The rule proposed by respondent, in contrast, would leave
acceptance or rejection of a state forum to the master of the counterclaim. It
would allow a defendant to remove a case brought in state court under state law,
thereby defeating a plaintiff’s choice of forum, simply by raising a federal
counterclaim. Second, conferring this power upon the defendant would radically
expand the class of removable cases, contrary to the “[d]ue regard for the rightful
independence of state governments” that our cases addressing removal require.
And finally, allowing responsive pleadings by the defendant to establish “arising
under” jurisdiction would undermine the clarity and ease of administration of the
well-pleaded-complaint doctrine, which serves as a “quick rule of thumb” for
resolving jurisdictional conflicts.
Id. at 831–32 (internal citations omitted).
310. See generally Paul M. Schoenhard, Gaps, Conflicts and Ambiguities in the Federal Courts’ PostAIA Patent Jurisdiction, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20 (2013) (discussing the newly amended
statutory provisions for federal district courts’ and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictions).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) now reads, in relevant part:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United
States, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, or the
District Court of the Northern Mariana Islands, in any civil action arising under,
or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim
arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.
Id.
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jurisdiction in any civil action in which a party asserts a compulsory
counterclaim arising under patent statutes.312
According to the legislative history relating to the amendment of
the patent statute on compulsory counter claim jurisdiction, the
definition for “compulsory counterclaim” is the same definition
provided in Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 313 To
satisfy the definition, the compulsory counterclaim must arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence and not require the joinder of
parties over whom the court would lack jurisdiction.314 The rationale
for the requirement that the counterclaim must be “compulsory” in
order for the Federal Circuit to have appellate jurisdiction is to
prevent the possibility that a “defendant could raise unrelated and
unnecessary patent counterclaims simply in order to manipulate
appellate jurisdiction.”315
Consequently, the new patent jurisdiction statutory provision
allows regional circuit courts to have appellate jurisdiction in cases
where the patent question is not a compulsory counterclaim.316 In
such cases, the patent question is merely a counterclaim that involves
different factual and legal issues and arises from different
transactions or occurrences. That means the regional circuits will
retain jurisdiction, and the Federal Circuit must transfer cases
involving patent counterclaims to regional circuit courts.
For example, in U.S. Water Services, Inc. v. ChemTreat, Inc., the
Eighth Circuit had jurisdiction over the appeal after the Federal
Circuit transferred the case.317 In that case, U.S. Water Services
(USWS) filed a trade secret misappropriation lawsuit against

312. Id.
313. 157 CONG. REC. S1378, S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). See also Joe
Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539,
540 (2013) (discussing the legislative history of the amended patent jurisdiction provisions or the
Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Circulations Systems, Inc. fix).
314. 157 CONG. REC. at S1379.
315. Id.
316. Schoenhard, supra note 310, at 22 (observing that the new statutory provision for the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction over patent compulsory counterclaims “comes at a price: [because] all circuit
courts must now conduct a threshold inquiry into whether a ‘compulsory counterclaim’ was
‘asserted.’”).
317. U.S. Water Servs., Inc. v. ChemTreat, Inc., 570 Fed. App’x 924, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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ChemTreat under Minnesota law.318 ChemTreat filed a counterclaim
of invalidity and non-infringement of one of USWS’s patents.319 The
parties then settled the lawsuit, and the district court granted a
judgment of non-infringement in ChemTreat’s favor.320 USWS
appealed the district court’s non-infringement decision to the Federal
Circuit.321 The Federal Circuit observed that the patent issue was first
raised in a counterclaim that was not a “compulsory counterclaim”
and held that the case did not arise under patent law.322 The Federal
Circuit, therefore, had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the
patent issue was merely supplemental.323 The Federal Circuit
transferred the case to the Eighth Circuit.324
Also, in Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., the Federal Circuit
transferred the appeal to the Third Circuit because the patent claim
was not a compulsory counterclaim.325 In that case, Mr. Wawrzynski
developed and obtained a patent for “Method of Food Article
Dipping and Wiping in a Condimental Container.”326 He sent his
patented invention of condiment packaging and promotional
materials to the Heinz Company in request for a meeting. 327 The
Heinz Company representatives met with Mr. Wawrzynski.328
Thereafter, they expressed disinterest in his packaging and declined a
second meeting.329
A few months later, the Heinz Company released its new “Dip &
Squeeze” package.330 Wawrzynski then filed a lawsuit in Michigan
state court against the Heinz Company relating to the “Dip &
Squeeze” package, alleging breach of implied contract and unjust
enrichment based on Heinz’s alleged use of Wawrzynski’s ideas for
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
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Id. at 925.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 925–26 n.2.
U.S. Water Servs., 570 Fed. App’x at 926.
Id.
Wawrzynski v. H.J. Heinz Co., 728 F.3d 1374, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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condiment packaging.331 Heinz successfully moved to transfer the
action from Michigan state court to the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction.332 Heinz then filed an answer, affirmative defenses, a
counterclaim that alleged non-infringement of the Wawrzynski
patent, and that the patent was invalid.333 Prior to filing a response,
Wawrzynski claimed he had already granted Heinz a covenant not to
sue for patent infringement.334 Wawrzynski filed an answer to
Heinz’s counterclaim that he was not suing Heinz for patent
infringement and sought to dismiss Heinz’s counterclaim for failure
to present a case or controversy, among other deficiencies.335 The
district court denied Wawrzynski’s motion.336 Subsequently, Heinz
moved for summary judgment arguing that Wawrzynski’s other
claims were preempted by federal patent law and that there was noninfringement of Wawrzynski’s patent; the district court ruled in
Heinz’s favor.337 Among other issues raised on appeal, Wawrzynski
asserted that he never alleged patent infringement in this case, and
therefore the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.338
With respect to the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims arising under patent law, the Federal Circuit observed
that the plaintiff’s complaint was filed prior to the effective date of
the newly amended Section 1295—the provision conferring the
Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over counterclaims.339
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Wawrzynski, 728 F.3d at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1376–77.
Id. at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Wawrzynski, 728 F.3d at 1377.
Id.
Id. at 1378–79. The Wawrzynski court noted:
Even assuming that Heinz’s counterclaim was compulsory, Mr. Wawrzynski’s
case does not meet the effective date requirement of the AIA version of § 1295,
which applies to “any civil action commenced on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act,” which is September 16, 2011. Pub. L. 112–29, § 19(e),
125 Stat. 284, 333. Mr. Wawrzynski’s complaint was filed and the “action
commenced” prior to this date. The plain language of § 1295 provides no
exceptions to its effective date requirement.

Id.
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Moreover, even if the effective date was not an issue, Heinz’s
counterclaim was not compulsory because both parties did not
consent to litigate the patent infringement claim.340 Specifically, the
Federal Circuit explained:
Mr. Wawrzynski cannot point to an express or implied
consent by the parties to litigate Heinz’s counterclaim.
Quite to the contrary, Mr. Wawrzynski moved on two
separate occasions to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis
of lack of jurisdiction. In order to divest the counterclaim,
Mr. Wawrzynski went so far as to admit in his pleadings
that Heinz did not infringe the ′990 patent and to provide
Heinz with a covenant not to sue. Heinz certainly wished to
litigate its counterclaim, but one party’s consent is not
sufficient for us to deem the complaint amended.341
In addition to the lack of a compulsory counterclaim, the Federal
Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction to retain the case under the
well-pleaded complaint doctrine for patent infringement because Mr.
Wawrzynski insisted that he had filed the original complaint only
under state claims with clear intentions.342 In addition, Mr.
Wawrzynski insisted that Heinz did not infringe his patent because he
provided Heinz with the covenant not to sue.343 Accordingly, the case
came to the federal court via diversity jurisdiction, not via wellpleaded complaint patent infringement jurisdiction.344
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
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Id. at 1378–79.
Id. at 1379.
Id. at 1380–81.
Wawrzynski, 728 F.3d at 1379.
Id. at 1381. The Federal Circuit further explained:
[W]e have concluded that the relief requested in the complaint aligns with state
law claims and not a claim for patent infringement. We also found support for Mr.
Wawrzynski’s contention that certain of the ideas and materials he allegedly
provided to Heinz are not found in his patent. These conclusions, along with our
overarching conclusion that the complaint does not present a well-pleaded patent
law issue, undercut conclusions relied upon by the district court to support its
grant of summary judgment of preemption. Accordingly, it appears that nothing
in federal patent law now stands in the way of Mr. Wawrzynski pursuing his state
law claims.
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In light of the above-cited cases decided prior to the amendment to
the patent jurisdiction statutory provisions, regional circuit courts
will face difficult questions conducting inquiries for jurisdiction.
Specifically, courts will have to address whether the counterclaim
was “compulsory” and when the “compulsory counterclaim” was
“asserted.”345
In summary, there are several grounds for regional circuit courts to
have jurisdiction in patent cases. Those grounds include cases where
(1) the patent issues are not substantial,346 (2) states have a strong
interest in the non-patent issues under federalism,347 and (3) the
patent claim is a non-compulsory counterclaim.348 Regional circuit
courts and, when appropriate, state appellate courts must properly
exercise their jurisdiction; they should not shy away from cases when
they see and hear the word “patent.” Conversely, the Federal Circuit
must loosen its grip in the three identified areas discussed above.
CONCLUSION
The new jurisdictional battle waged by the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits for a share of patent cases will erode the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive patent jurisdiction. There are legitimate grounds for
regional circuits to share patent cases with the Federal Circuit.
Regional circuit courts, through diversity jurisdiction, can retain
appellate jurisdiction in cases where patent issues are insubstantial
and hypothetical in comparison to state law claims wielding strong
state interests. In addition, regional circuit courts can exert
jurisdiction over non-compulsory patent counterclaims. Most
importantly, in light of the rise in patent prominence and the growth
of patent jurisprudence stewarded solely by the Federal Circuit in the
last thirty-three years, regional circuit courts must proceed with
Id.
345. Schoenhard, supra note 310, at 22–23 (observing that circuit courts’ jurisdictional inquiry
“involves a question of timing. Is jurisdiction based on any counterclaims, as originally filed? As
amended? Or, as . . . extant at the time appeal is taken?”).
346. See supra Part V.B.
347. See supra Part V.A.
348. See supra Part V.C.
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utmost care. After all, sharing judicial labor is a task of delicate
balance that all circuit courts must treasure in the interest of justice.
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